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Ajtai recently found a random class of lattices of integer points for
which he could prove the following worst-caseaverage-case equivalence
result: If there is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm which finds a
short vector in a random lattice from the class, then there is also a proba-
bilistic polynomial time algorithm which solves several problems related
to the shortest lattice vector problem (SVP) in any n-dimensional lattice.
Ajtai and Dwork then designed a public-key cryptosystem which is
provably secure unless the worst case of a version of the SVP can be
solved in probabilistic polynomial time. However, their cryptosystem
suffers from massive data expansion because it encrypts data bit-by-bit.
Here we present a public-key cryptosystem based on similar ideas, but
with much less data expansion. ] 1999 Academic Press
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1. INTRODUCTION
Since the origin of the idea of public-key cryptography, there have been many
public-key techniques described in the literature. The security of essentially all of
these depends on certain widely believed but unproven mathematical hypotheses.
For example, the well-known RSA public-key cryptosystem relies on the hypothesis
that it is difficult to factor a large integer n which is known to be a product of two
large primes. This hypothesis has been extensively studied, but there is still no proof
that for a typical such n, the prime factors cannot be found in some number of steps
bounded by a polynomial in log n. From a computational complexity point of view,
we generate a specific instance of a problem in NP (together with a solution, which
is kept secret) and we rely on the belief that the problem is difficult to solve.
Apart from the lack of proof that any of these problems is really hard, i.e., there
exists no efficient algorithm that will solve the problem in all cases, there is another
serious issue. The mathematical hypothesis that these problems are difficult to solve
really means difficult to solve in the worst case, but the security of the cryptographic
algorithms depends more on the difficulty of the average case. For example, even if
one day factoring is proved to be unsolvable in probabilistic polynomial time, to
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the users of the RSA system, there is no guarantee that the key they are actually
using is hard to factor. To use these protocols, one must be able to generate specific
instances of the problem which are almost certain to be hard to solve. But typically
there is no way to just generate known hard instances. One way to do this is to
generate random instances of the problem and hope that such instances are as hard
on the average as in the worst case. However, this property is known to be not true
for a number of NP-hard problems.
Recently Ajtai [1] proved that certain lattice problems related to the shortest
lattice vector problem (SVP) have essentially the same average case and worst case
complexity, and both are conjectured to be extremely hard. This development raises
the possibility of public-key cryptosystems which will have a new level of security.
Already Ajtai and Dwork [3] have proposed a public-key cryptosystem which has
a provable worst-caseaverage-case equivalence. Specifically, the AjtaiDwork cryp-
tosystem is secure unless the worst case of a certain lattice problem can be solved
in probabilistic polynomial time.
Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Halevi [11] have also given a public-key crypto-
system which depends on similar lattice problems related to SVP as in [1]. Unlike
the work of [3], however, their method uses a trapdoor one-way function and also
lacks a proof of worst-caseaverage-case equivalence.
The cryptosystems of [3] are unfortunately far from being practical. All of them
encrypt messages bit-by-bit and involve massive data expansion: the encryption will
be at least a hundred times as long as the message. In this paper we propose a
public-key cryptosystem, based on the ideas of [1] and [3], which has much less
data expansion. Messages are encrypted in blocks instead of bit-by-bit. We offer
some statistical analysis of our cryptosystem. We also analyze several attacks on the
system and show that the system is secure against these attacks. Whether there is
a provable worst-caseaverage-case equivalence for this system is open.
2. LATTICE PROBLEMS WITH WORST-CASEAVERAGE-CASE EQUIVALENCE
Here we briefly define the terms for lattice problems and describe the results of
Ajtai [1] and some improvements.
Notation. R is the field of real numbers, Z is the ring of integers, Rn is the space
of n-dimensional real vectors a=(a1 , ..., an) with the usual dot product a } b and
Euclidean norm or length &a&=(a } a)12. Zn is the set of vectors in Rn with integer
coordinates, Z+ is the positive integers and Zq is the ring of integers modulo q.
Definitions. If A=[a1 , ..., an] is a set of linearly independent vectors in Rn,
then we say that the set of vectors
{ :
n
i=1
kiai : k1 , ..., kn # Z=
is a lattice in Rn. We will denote the lattice by L(A) or L(a1 , ..., an). We call A a
basis of the lattice. We say that a set in Rn is an n-dimensional lattice if there is a
basis V of n linearly independent vectors such that L=L(V). If A=[a1 , ..., an] is
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a set of vectors in a lattice L, then we define the length of the set A by maxni=1 &a i&.
*1(L)=min0{v # L &v&.
A fundamental theorem of Minkowski is the following.
Theorem 2.1 (Minkowski). There is a universal constant #, such that for any
lattice L of dimension n, _v # L, v{0, such that
&v&# - n(det L)1n.
The determinant det L of a lattice is the volume of the n-dimensional fundamen-
tal parallelepiped, and the absolute constant # is known as Hermite’s constant.
Minkowski’s theorem is a pure existence type theorem; it offers no clue as to how
to find a short or shortest nonzero vector in a high dimensional lattice. To find the
shortest nonzero vector in an n-dimensional lattice, given in terms of a basis, is
known as the shortest vector problem (SVP). There are no known efficient algo-
rithms for finding the shortest nonzero vector in the lattice. Nor are there efficient
algorithms to find an approximate short nonzero vector, or just to approximate its
length, within any fixed polynomial factor in its dimension n. This is still true even
if the shortest nonzero vector v is unique in the sense that any other vector in the
lattice whose length is at most nc &v& is parallel to v, where c is an absolute constant.
In this case we say that v is unique up to a polynomial factor.
The best algorithm to date for finding a short vector in an arbitrary lattice in Rn
is the L3 algorithm of Lenstra, Lenstra, and Lova sz [14]. This algorithm finds in
deterministic polynomial time a vector which differs from the shortest one by at
most a factor 2(n&1)2. Schnorr [16] proved that the factor can be replaced by
(1+=)n for any fixed =>0. However, Schnorr’s algorithm has a running time with
1= in the exponent.
Regarding computational complexity, Ajtai [2] proved that it is NP-hard to find
the shortest lattice vector in Euclidean norm, as well as approximating the shortest
vector length up to a factor of 1+12n k. In a forthcoming paper [6], Cai and
Nerurkar improve the NP-hardness result of Ajtai [2] to show that the problem
of approximating the shortest vector length up to a factor of 1+1n=, for any =>0
is also NP-hard. This improvement also works for all lp -norms for 1p<. Prior
to that, it was known that the shortest lattice vector problem is NP-hard for the
l -norm and the nearest lattice vector problem is NP-hard under all lp-norms,
p1 [12, 17]. Even finding an approximate solution to within any constant factor
for the nearest vector problem for any lp -norm is NP-hard [4]. On the other hand,
Lagarias, Lenstra, and Schnorr [13] showed that the approximation problem (in
l2 -norm) within a factor of O(n) cannot be NP-hard, unless NP=coNP. Goldreich
and Goldwasser showed that approximating the shortest lattice vector within a
factor of O(- nlog n) is not NP-hard assuming the polynomial time hierarchy does
not collapse [9]. Cai showed that finding an n14-unique shortest lattice vector is
not NP-hard unless the polynomial time hierarchy collapses [7].
What is most striking is a recent result of Ajtai [1] establishing the first explicit
connection between the worst-case and the average-case complexity of the problem
of finding the shortest lattice vector or approximating its length. The connection
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factor in the Ajtai connection has been improved in [5]. Ajtai defined a class of
lattices in Zm (m>n) so that if there is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm
which finds a short vector in a random lattice from the class with a probability of
at least 1nO(1), then there is also a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm which
solves the following three lattice problems in every lattice in Zn with a probability
exponentially close to 1:
(P1) Find the length of a shortest nonzero vector in an n-dimensional lattice,
up to a polynomial factor.
(P2) Find the shortest nonzero vector in an n-dimensional lattice where the
shortest vector is unique up to a polynomial factor.
(P3) Find a basis in an n-dimensional lattice whose length is the smallest
possible, up to a polynomial factor.
The lattices in the random class are defined modulo q (q is an integer depending
only on n, as described below), that is, if two integer vectors are congruent modulo
q then either both of them or neither of them belong to the lattice. More precisely,
if &=[u1 , ..., um] is a given set of vectors in Znq then the lattice 4(&) is the set of
all integer vectors (h1 , ..., hm) so that
:
m
i=1
hiui #0 (mod q).
For fixed n, m, and q, the probability distribution over the random class is defined
by uniformly choosing a sequence of integer vectors u1 , ..., um .
For a given n, the parameters m and q are defined by m=[c1n] and q=[nc2 ],
where c1 and c2 are suitable constants.
The problem of finding a short vector in a lattice from the random class is a
Diophantine problem. Questions of this type date back to Dirichlet’s 1842 theorem
on simultaneous Diophantine approximation. From this point of view the problem
can be stated in the following way, which does not involve any explicit mention of
lattices, as pointed out in [10].
(A1) Given n, m=[c1n], q=[nc2 ] and an n by m matrix M with entries in Zq ,
find a non-zero vector x so that Mx#0 (mod q) and &x&<n.
Minkowski’s theorem guarantees the existence of such short vectors x. Of course
if the condition on &x& is removed, then the linear system Mx#0 (mod q) can be
solved in polynomial time.
The theorem in [1] reduces the worst-case complexity of each of the problems
(P1), (P2), (P3) to the average case complexity of (A1). Currently the best bounds
that can be achieved are stated below [5, 8]:
Theorem 2.2 [5]. For any constant =>0, if there exists a probabilistic polynomial
time algorithm A such that, for a given random lattice 4(&), where &=(u1 , ..., um) #
Zn_mq is uniformly chosen, q=3(n
3) and m=3(n), A will find a vector of the lattice
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4(&) of length n with probability 1nO(1), then, there also exists a probabilistic poly-
nomial time algorithm B which for any lattice L=L(a1 , ..., an) given by a basis
a1 , ..., an # Zn, outputs another basis for L, b1 , ..., bn , so that
max
n
i=1
&bi &3(n3.5+=) min
all bases b$1 , ..., b$n for L
max
n
i=1
&b$i&.
Theorem 2.3 [8]. Under the same hypothesis, there exists a probabilistic polyno-
mial time algorithm C which for any lattice L=L(a1 , ..., an) given by a basis will
v compute an estimate of *1=*1(L) up to a factor n4+=, i.e., compute a numerical
estimate * 1 , such that
*1
n4+=
* 1*1 ;
v find the unique shortest vector if it is an n4+=-unique shortest vector.
3. A NEW CRYPTOSYSTEM
Here we present the design of a new cryptosystem, which is based on the difficulty
of finding or approximating SVP, even though no specific lattices are defined. The
secret key in the new system is a vector u chosen with uniform distribution from the
unit sphere Sn&1=[x | &x&=1], and a random permutation _ on m+1 letters. By
allowing an exponentially small roundoff error, we may assume that the coor-
dinates of u are rational numbers whose denominators are bounded by some very
large integer, exponential in n. Let m=[cn] for a suitable absolute constant c<1.
For definiteness set c=12. Let H i=[v: v } u=i] denote the hyperplanes perpendi-
cular to u. The public key in the new system is a parameter b>0 and a set [v_(0) , ...,
v_(m)] of rational vectors, where each vj is in one of the hyperplanes H i for some
i # Z+, say vj } u=N j # Z+. We choose a sequence of numbers Nj so that it is super-
increasing; that is,
N0>b, Ni> :
i&1
j=0
N i+b for each i=1, 2, ..., m.
Binary plaintext is encrypted in blocks of m+1 bits. If P=($0 , ..., $m) is a plain-
text block ($i=0 or 1), then P is encrypted as a random perturbation of mi=0 $iv_(i) .
More precisely, the sender picks a uniformly chosen random vector r with &r&b2.
Then the ciphertext is
:
m
i=0
$iv_(i)+r.
Decryption is accomplished by using the secret key u to compute the following
inner product:
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S=u } \ :
m
i=0
$iv_(i)+r+
= :
m
i=0
$i (u } v_(i))+u } r
= :
m
i=0
$i N_(i)+u } r
= :
m
i=0
$_&1 (i) Ni+u } r.
Since the Ni are superincreasing, we can use the greedy algorithm to efficiently
recover the $_&1 (i) from S and then use the secret _ to recover $i . More precisely,
if $_&1 (m)=1 then SNm&b2, and if $_&1 (m)=0, then SN0+N1+ } } } +
Nm&1+b2. Since Nm>m&1i=0 Ni+b, with the secret key one can discover whether
$_&1 (m)=0 or 1. Substituting S by S$=S&$_&1(m)Nm , this process can be continued
until all $_&1 (i) are recovered. Then using the secret permutation _, one recovers
$0 , $1 , ..., $m .
Thus decryption using u and _ involves an easy instance of a knapsack problem.
As summarized in the article of Odlyzko [15], essentially all suggestions for cryp-
tosystems based on knapsack problems have been broken. Here, however, the easy
knapsack problem appears to have no bearing on the security of the system, since
it appears that one must first search for the direction u.
The new cryptosystem has similarities with the third version of the AjtaiDwork
cryptosystem (see [3]), but in the new system m+1=O(n) bits of plaintext are
encrypted to an n-dimensional ciphertext vector, instead of just one bit of plaintext.
We have not specified the distribution of the vi , aside from its inner product with
u being superincreasing. The following distribution has a strong statistical indist-
inguishability from m+1 independent uniform samples of the sphere. Let M be a
large integer, say M>>2n. Choose any b$>b. For analysis purposes we will
normalize by denoting vi M as vi . For each i, 0im, let vi=(2ib$M) u+
- 1&(22ib$2M 2) \i , where the \ i ’s are independently and uniformly distributed on
the (n&2)-dimensional unit sphere orthogonal to u. Note that each &vi &=1, after
normalization. We denote this distribution by D. We note that
u } vi&u } \ :
i&1
j=0
vj+=2
ib$
M
> :
i&1
j=0
2 jb$
M
=
b$
M
>
b
M
.
Given the above description, we can compare the new cryptosystem to the RSA
cryptosystem. For the latter, the natural security parameter is k=the logarithm of
the RSA modulus. The public and secret keys of RSA have size O(k), and both
encryption and decryption require time O(k3) (using ordinary multiplication algo-
rithms). For the lattice-based cryptosystem, the natural security parameter is the
dimension n. The keys for the new system are relatively large: size O(n3) for the
public key and O(n2) for the secret key. However, the time required for encryption
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is only O(n) and no multiplications are needed. Decryption requires time O(n3),
comparable to RSA (again using ordinary multiplication algorithms).
How secure is this new cryptosystem? We do not have a proof of worst-case
average-case equivalence. We can discuss several ideas for attacks that do not seem
to work. The following discussion will also explain some of the choices made in the
design of the cryptosystem.
We will first show that if we did not employ the random permutation _, rather
we publish as public key the unpermuted vectors v0 , ..., vm , then there is an attack
based on linear programming that will break the system in polynomial time.
The attack works as follows: From the given vectors v0 , ..., vm we are assured that
the following set of inequalities defines a nonempty convex body containing the
secret vector u:
v0 } x > b
v1 } x > v0 } x+b
v2 } x > (v0+v1) } x+b
b b b
vm } x > (v0+v1+ } } } +vm&1) } x+b
Using linear programming to find a feasible solution to this convex body, we can
compute in polynomial time a vector u~ satisfying all the inequalities. Even though
u~ may not be equal to u, as long as u~ satisfies the above set of inequalities, it is as
good as u itself to decrypt the message mi=0 $iv i+r. Hence, the permutation _ is
essential to the security of the protocol.
Next, let us consider the addition of the random perturbation r. This is to guard
against an attack based on linear algebra, which works as follows.
Assume the message w=mi=0 $iv_(i) was sent without the perturbation vector r.
Then this vector is in the linear span of [v_(0) , v_(1) , ..., v_(m)], which is most likely
to be linearly independent, by the way these vi ’s are chosen. Then one can solve for
the m+1<n coefficients xi in w=mi=0 x iv_(i) . These coefficients are unique by
linear independence; thus, xi=$i and we recover the plaintext.
The addition of the random perturbation r renders this attack ineffective, since
with probability very near one, w=mi=0 $ iv_(i)+r is not in the linear span of
[v_(0) , v_(1) , ..., v_(m)], which is of dimension at most m+1. (If r were truly
uniformly random from the ball &x&b2 then the probability that w belongs to
the lower dimensional linear span is zero; if r is chosen with rational coordinates
with exponentially large denominator then this probability is exponentially small.)
When the vector w is not in the linear span, recovering the coefficients $i appears
to be no easier than the well-known nearest lattice vector problem, which is
believed to be intractable.
Finally, if the lengths of the vectors vi are not kept essentially the same, there can
be statistical leakage of information (see Section 4). However, suppose the vi are all
roughly the same length, then the number of message bits m=cn should be less
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than n. If m were equal to cn for a constant c>1 then there is the following cryp-
tanalytic attack.
Suppose &vi&rV for each i and define numbers Qi by
Qi=
|u } vi |
&u& &vi&
r
N i
&u& V
.
Since the integers Ni are superincreasing, we can show that for all i<m&3 log n,
Qi<Qm n3. In fact, let m$=m&3 log n, then we can inductively prove that Qm$+ j
>2 j Qm$&12 j Qi for all i<m$. Thus for each i<m$ we have Qi<Qm n3. We will
say that these Qi are ‘‘unusually small’’ (compared to maxQj). Of course one cannot
compute the Qi ’s since one is given only the permuted ordering by _ and u is secret.
The attack begins with the selection of a random subset of n&1 vectors vi . If we
get all n&1 vectors having an unusually small dot product with the secret vector
u, then the normal vector perpendicular to all these n&1 vectors will be a good
approximation to u. From this one can break the system. We show next that, with
nontrivial probability 1nO(1), all n&1 vectors have an unusually small dot product
with the secret vector u. This is at least
\cn&3 log nn&1 +
\ cnn&1+
\1&3 log ncn&n +
n
rn&3(c&1).
Thus, one can try for a polynomial number of times, and with high probability one
will find such a set of n&1 vectors and break the system. This attack will not work
if m=n2.
4. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
It is clear from the discussion that the secret permutation _, as well as the
random perturbation r are both necessary. With a secret permutation _, however,
an adversary may still attempt to find or approximate the secret vector u. In this
section, the random perturbation r does not play an essential role in the analysis;
it is easier to discard r in the following analysis, which is essentially the same
with r, although a little less clean. Thus we will carry out the following analysis
with b=0 and r=0.
A natural attack is to gather statistical information by computing some values
associated with the vectors v_(0) , ..., v_(m) which are invariant under the permutations.
It is conceivable, for example, that mi=0 vi=
m
i=0 v_(i) might have a nontrivial correla-
tion with the secret direction u since each vi has a positive component in the u direction.
We will show that if we did not choose our distribution for the vi ’s carefully, then
indeed this attack may succeed; but the distribution D appears to be secure against
this attack.
Consider again the structural requirement that v0 } u>0 and vi } u>(v0+ } } } +
vi&1) } u. A natural distribution for the vi ’s is to choose increment vectors wi so that
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vi=(v0+ } } } +v i&1)+wi , where wi are independently and uniformly distributed on
the (n&1)-dimensional hemisphere S n&1+ =[x # R
n | &x&=1, x } u>0], which
consists of all the unit vectors in Rn in the u direction. We will call this distribution F.
Let si=v0+ } } } +vi , 0im. Then v0=w0 , vi=si&1+wi , and si=2iw0+ } } } 20wi
by an easy induction. We need some preliminaries. Let ;n denote the n-dimensional
volume of the unit n-ball, let $n&1 denote the (n&1)-dimensional volume of the
unit (n&1)-sphere, then
;n=|
1
0
$n&1rn&1 dr=
$n&1
n
, n2,
and
;n=|
1
&1
;n&1(- 1&h2)n&1 dh=2;n&1 In ,
where the integral
In=|
?2
0
sinn % d%=
n&1
n
In&2= } } } =
- ?
2
1 \n+12 +
1 \n+22 +
.
So In r- ?2n asymptotically for large n. Also,
;n=|
2?
0
|
1
0
;n&2(- 1&h2)n&2 r dr d%=;n&2
2?
n
=
?n2
1 \n+22 +
.
We will use the uniform distribution U on sets such as the hemisphere S n&1+ ,
namely the Lebesgue measure on S n&1+ , and we will denote a random variable X
uniformly distributed on such a set S by X # U S. The following analysis is carried
out using the exact Lebesgue measure. In the actual cryptographic protocols, this
must be replaced by an exponentially close approximation on the set of rational
points with exponentially large (polynomially bounded in binary length) denominators.
The errors are exponentially small and thus insignificant. For clarity of presenta-
tion, we will state all results in terms of the exact Lebesgue measure.
Lemma 4.1. Let w, w$ # US n&1+ be independently and uniformly distributed on the
unit (northern) hemisphere. Let u be the north pole. Then the expectation of the inner
product
E[w } u]=
1
(n&1) In&2
=
2
(n&1) - ?
1 \n2+
1 \n&12 +
r 2?n .
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Also,
E[(w } u)2]=
1
n
,
E[(w } u)(w$ } u)]=(E[w } u])2r
2
?n
.
Proof. For w #U S n&1+ , the density function for the value of the inner product
h=w } u is
pn&1(h)=(- 1&h2)n&3In&2 .
Hence,
E[w } u]=|
1
0
hpn&1(h) dh=
1
(n&1) In&2
=
2
(n&1) - ?
1 \n2+
1 \n&12 +
r 2?n .
Similarly,
E[(w } u)2]=|
1
0
h2pn&1(h) dh=
1
n
.
We note in passing that ES n&1 [(w } u)2] over the whole unit sphere Sn&1 is 1n as
well, by symmetry h  &h.
The last equality follows from independence of w and w$, so we have
E[(w } u)(w$ } u)]=E[hh$]=E[h]E[h$]=(E[h])2r
2
?n
.
Lemma 4.2. Let w, w$, w" #U S n&1+ be independently and uniformly distributed on
the unit hemisphere. Then
E[w } w$]=(E[w } u])2r
2
?n
.
E[(w } w$)2]=
1
n
.
E[(w } w$)(w } w")]=(E[w } u])2 E[(w } u)2]r
2
?n2
.
Proof. Let w, w$, w" #U S n&1+ . Choose a coordinate system so that u is the n th-
coordinate. Then w } w$=ni=1 xi (w) yi(w$). By linearity and independence E[w } w$]
=ni=1 E[xi] E[ y i]. For i<n, the symmetry x i  &x i implies that E[x i]=0. For
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i=n, xn(w)=w } u, and similarly for yn(w$). Then it follows that E[xn]=E[ yn]=
E[h], and
E[w } w$]=(E[h])2r
2
?n
.
For E[(w } w$)2], expand (ni=1 x i yi)
2=ni=1 x
2
i y
2
i +1i{jn xi yix j yj . For
i{j, at least one of i or j is not n, and by independence and the symmetry
xi  &xi , we have E[x i yixj yj]=E[xix j] E[ y i y j]=0. Thus the expectation of
the second term is 0. By linearity and independence
E[(w } w$)2]= :
n
i=1
E[x2i ] E[ y
2
i ].
For i=n, it is (E[h2])2=1n2. For i<n, by the symmetry xn  &xn , it can be seen
that E[x2i ] is the same if we were to evaluate this expectation on the uniform distri-
bution on the whole unit sphere. But on the whole sphere this is the same as
ES n&1 [x2n]=ESn&1 [h
2]. This, however, by the symmetry h  &h, is the same again
if we were to evaluate it back on the hemisphere S n&1+ . Hence ultimately E[x
2
i ]=
E[h2]=1n, and E[x2i ] E[ y
2
i ]=1n
2. It follows that
E[(w } w$)2]=1n.
Finally for E[(w } w$)(w } w")], we expand the product (ni=1 xi yi)(
n
j=1 xj zj)=
ni=1 x
2
i y izi+1i{jn xi yi xjzj . For i{j, at least one of them is not n, so that
either E[ yi]=0 or E[zj]=0, thus 1i{jn E[x2i ] E[ yi] E[zj]=0. Then
E[(w } w$)(w } w")]= :
n
i=1
E[x2i ] E[ y i] E[zi].
For i<n, E[ yi]=0 by symmetry as before. For i=n, it is E[h2](E[h])2r2?n2.
This completes the proof.
For the distribution F, we will show that the secret information u is not safe. In
fact we claim that sm can be used to approximate the direction u. Consider sm } u=
2m(w0 } u)+ } } } +20(wm } u). Now
EF[sm } u]=(2m+ } } } +20) E[w } u]r2m+1  2?n .
Next we compute the variance VarF[sm } u]. First (sm } u)2=22m(w0 } u)2+ } } } +
20(wm } u)2+0i{jm 2m&i2m& j (wi } u)(wj } u). So
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EF[(sm } u)2]=(22m+ } } } +20) E[(w } u)2]+ :
0i{jm
2i+ jE[(w } u)(w$ } u)]
=
4m+1&1
3n
+_ :
0i, jm
2i+j& :
0im
22i& (E[w } u])2
r
4m+1
3n
+
4m+2
3?n
=
4m+1
3?n
(4+?).
It follows that
VarF[sm } u]r
4m+1
3?n
(?&2).
We note that the normalized ratio
EF[sm } u]
- VarF[sm } u]
r 6?&2r2.2925564.
This indicates that sm has a significant correlation with the hidden direction u and,
hence, u cannot be considered secure under this distribution F.
More directly, it can be shown that
EF[sm } (vm&vm&1)]
EF[&sm &] EF[&vm&vm&1 &]
1
asymptotically. Thus one can expect sm to be used to distinguish vm from the others.
We now return to our chosen distribution D and show that in this distribution
there is no easy statistical leakage. In this distribution, vi=(2iM) u+- 1&(22iM2)
\i , and \i are independently and uniformly distributed on the (n&2)-dimensional
unit sphere orthogonal to u. Recall &vi &=1. Let s$i=v0+ } } } +v i . We consider
&s$m&2 and s$m } u. Clearly &s$i &2=(m+1)+0i{jm (vi } vj).
Lemma 4.3. For 0i{jm,
ED[vi } vj]=
2i+ j
M2
, VarD[vi } vj]=
1
n&1 \1&
22i
M2+\1&
22j
M2+ .
Proof. We have
vi } vj=
2i+ j
M2
+1& 2
2i
M 2 1&
22j
M2
(\i } \j).
By symmetry, ESn&2[\ i } \j]=0, so that ED[vi } vj]=2i+ jM 2. Thus,
VarD[v i } v j]=\1& 2
2i
M2+\1&
22j
M2+ VarD[\i } \j].
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We have VarD[\i } \j]=ED[(\i } \j)2]=1&1 h
2( pn&2(h)2) dh=1(n&1). The lemma
follows.
Now
ED[&s$m&2]=(m+1)+ :
0i{jm
2i+ j
M2
,
and 0i{jm 2i+j=0i, jm 2i+ j&mi=0 2
2ir 83 (2mM)2. Hence, ED[&s$m&2]r
(m+1)+(22m+33). Ignoring the exponentially small term 22mM 2, ED[&s$m&2]r
m+1.
One should compare this with the uniform distribution U for which all vi ’s are
independently and uniformly distributed on Sn&1. In this case EU[vi } v j]=0 for
i{j, and EU[&s$m&2]=m+1.
We next evaluate the variance VarD[&s$m&2]:
VarD[&s$m &2]=ED _{ :
0i{jm
(vi } vj&ED[vi } vj])=
2
&
=4ED _{ :
0i< jm
1& 2
2i
M2 1&
22j
M2
(\i } \j)=
2
&
=4ED _ :
(i< j) \1&
22i
M 2+\1&
22j
M2+ (\i } \j)2
+ :
(i< j){(i $< j $)
c(ij)c(i $j $)(\i } \j)(\i $ } \ j $)& .
For (i< j){(i $< j $), there are two cases. If (i, j, i $, j $) are all distinct indices, then
clearly \i } \j and \i $ } \j $ are independent. Thus, ED[(\ i } \j)(\ i $ } \j $)]=ED[\i } \j]
ED[\ i $ } \j $]=0. If there are only three distinct indices among (i, j, i $, j $), say i=i $,
then by fixing \ i , the conditional distributions of \i } \ j and \i } \ j $ over \j and \j $
are independent, and ED[(\i } \ j) | \i]=ED[(\i } \j $) | \i]=0. Thus in any case
ED[(\i } \ j)(\ i $ } \j $)]=0, for (i< j){(i $< j $) and
VarD[&s$m&2]=4 :
0i< jm \1&
22i
M2+\1&
22j
M 2+ ED[(\i } \ j)2].
We have ED[(\ i } \ j)2]=ESn&2 [h2]=1(n&1). Ignoring exponentially small terms
such as 2mM, we get
VarD[&s$m&2]r
4
n&1 \
m+1
2 + .
This is to be compared to the uniform distribution U. Again &s$i&2=(m+1)+
0i{jm (vi } vj). But for the uniform distribution U, EU[vi } vj]=0 for i{j and
so,
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VarU[&s$m &2]=EU _{ :
0i{jm
(v i } vj)=
2
&
=4EU _ :
0i< jm
(vi } vj)2+ :
(i< j){(i $< j $)
(vi } v j)(vi $ } vj $)& .
By the same argument, EU[(vi } vj)(v i $ } vj $)]=0, for all (i< j){(i $< j $). Hence,
VarU[&s$m&2]=4 0i< jm EU[(vi } vj)2], where EU[(vi } vj)2] is E[h2] over the
(n&1)-dimensional unit sphere, and thus equal to 1n (see the proof of
Lemma 4.1). It follows that
VarU[&s$m&2]=
4
n \
m+1
2 + .
We conclude that at least in terms of the length of the sum &sm&=&v0+ } } } +vm&,
our distribution D behaves very much like the uniform distribution U.
We return to the correlation between s$m and u. It is easy to see that with distribu-
tion D
s$m } u= :
m
i=0
2i
M
r
2m+1
M
,
which is exponentially small. Also since it is a constant VarD[s$m } u]=0. For the
uniform distribution U,
s$m } u= :
m
i=0
vi } u
and EU[s$m } u]=0. For the variance,
VarU[s$m } u]=EU[(s$m } u)2]
=EU _\ :
m
i=0
(vi } u)+
2
&
=EU _ :
m
i=0
(vi } u)2+ :
0i{jm
(v i } u)(vj } u)& .
By independence, EU[(vi } u)(vj } u)]=EU[vi } u] EU[vj } u]=0 for i{j. Also
EU[(vi } u)2]=1n. Hence VarU[s$m } u]=mn. Therefore, statistically one can not
deduce much from s$m } u in the distribution D, since it is exponentially small, and
well within the range in which this value would have been under the uniform distri-
bution, where EU[s$m } u]=0 and VarU[s$m } u]=0(1).
In fact, suppose u$ # Sn&1 is any unit vector, u${\u. The estimates of EU[s$m } u$]
=0 and VarU[s$m } u$]=mn=0(1) are still valid. Let 6 be the 2-dimensional plane
spanned by u and u$. Let u$=(cos %)u+(sin %) u=, where the unit vector u= =u.
Then we can choose a coordinate system such that u= is the (n&1)th coordinate
for \i and ED[\ i } u=]=ES n&2 [h]=0. Therefore, ED[s$m } u$]=(cos %)ED[s$m } u].
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Thus, |ED[s$m } u$]|2m+1M, which is exponentially small. This implies that
s$m has a correlation with no particular direction, the same as under the uniform
distribution U.
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